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To KILL OR NOT To KILL: THE

UNENDING

CONUNDRUM
MR. JUSTICE S.B. SINRA*

ABSTRACT

Although there are numerous countries that proscribedeath sentences, there
is no internationalconsensus till date regardingits legality. The Indian legal
system too, has struggled with the constitutionality of death penalty and
with delineatingthe circumstancesin which it maybe granted. For instance,
it is true that the legendary case, Mithu v.State of Punjab, struck down
mandatory death sentences under the Indian Penal Code, but mandatory
death sentences provided under specific criminal legislations such as the
Arms Act are still contested. It is this uneasiness in the approach of the
Indian legalsystem to capitalpunishment that Justice S.B. Sinha explores in
this article.Providinga conceptual, historicoverview of the Indian position
of law, he explores the avatars of the Bachan Singh 'rarestof rare' test, how
trial processes in India are prone to mistakes and the problem of convicts
sentenced to death languishing on death row due to delays in execution.
Justice S.B. Sinha concludes by observing that the Indian judiciary is
becoming more reluctant to award the death sentence as there is greater
emphasis on alternativemodes of punishment and to the internationallegal
developments which militate against capitalpunishment.
"Americans consider their criminaljustice system to be the best in the world.
Some conservatives may carp that it coddles criminals,and some liberals may
believe that there not enough protectionsfor suspects, particularlyindigent
ones. By and large, however, the system yields justice.As former prosecutor
and defence counsel, however,I know the system is only good as the lawyers
who administerit - prosecutors,defence counsel,judges. Ifprosecutors abuse
their authority,if defence lawyers are lazy or incompetent, if
judges are weak
or biased, the result is injustice, and in capital cases that can spell death."
Raymond Bonner, "Anatomy of Injustice: A Murder Case Gone
Wrong", Knopf, 2012.
*

Former Judge, Supreme Court of India.
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The theoretical fear that an innocent life could be stifled out by an irreversible
penalty like death has received chilling confirmation in a recent Colombia
University Law School study that found the American State of Texas has wrongfully
executed one Carlos DeLuna in 1989,1 He was alleged to have murdered one Wanda
Lopez in Texas and was sentenced to death and executed while the real culprit,
one Carlos Hernandez was never brought to justice.
The 2011-2012 editors of the Columbia Human Rights Law Review rightly
commented that the article, "poignantly reveals how easily our legal system canfail to

producejust outcomes even without the deliberate interferenceof individuals acting in bad
faith and how the consequences of such failures can be irrevocable and, at times,fatal."
The authors in the article refer to the trial and execution of one Chipitta
Rodriguez in 1863 on the allegation of killing a trader for his gold. Poor and of
Mexican descent, she was convicted and sentenced by a jury handpicked by the
Sherriff, with her defence lawyer who did very little to defend her?
1
2
3

James S. Liebman, et at, Los Tocayos Carlos, 43 COLUMBIA HUMAN RiGHTs LAw REViEw
711 (2012). [Hereinafter, "Liebman"]
Liebman, 712.
Liebman, 1105.
In both of these senses, it is not Carlos Hernandez, but justice and truth that are the
phantoms of the story told here. It is not the ghost of Chipita Rodriguez, but the specter
that the criminal justice system of Texas has mistaken the innocent for the guilty and
the guilty for the innocent, that stalks the river bottoms whenever the state punishes
the "guilty" with the infinite finality of death. If the truth dies with the executed man,
so does justice, not only for him, but for the victim of the crime and for the real killer's
other victims later to come.

To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum
Things in India are equally bad, if not worse. In Swamy Shraddanandav. State
of Karnataka, the Supreme Court held:
33. The truth of the matter is that the question of death penalty is
not free from the subjective element and the confirmation of death
sentence or its commutation by this Court depends a good deal on
the personal predilection of the judges constituting the bench.
34. The inability of the Criminal Justice System to deal with all major
crimes equally effectively and the want of uniformity in the sentencing
process by the Court lead to a marked imbalance in the end results.
On the one hand there appears a small band of cases in which the
murder convict is sent to the gallows on confirmation of his death
penalty by this Court and on the other hand there is a much wider
area of cases in which the offender committing murder of a similar or
a far more revolting kind is spared his life due to lack of consistency
by the Court in giving punishments or worse, the offender is allowed
to slip away unpunished on account of the deficiencies in the Criminal
Justice System.
Thus the overall larger picture gets asymmetric and lop-sided and
presents a poor reflection of the system of criminal administration of
justice. This situation is matter of concern for this Court and needs
to be remedied.
This paper deals with the uneasy relationship of the Indian justice system with
the administration of the death penalty. The fact that imposition of death penalty in
India is as uncertain as in any other system prevalent in other countries is neither
in doubt nor in dispute. The question for the courts, however, is how to navigate
the death penalty maze while being aware of the undeniable truth regarding the
rickety nature of the machinery of death in our country.

I.

GLOBAL TRENDS ON THE DEATH PENALTY

Despite fewer countries executing prisoners than ever before, death penalty
is still alive and well around the world. Excluding China, the latest Amnesty
report records,"Atleast 676 executions were known to have been carried out worldwide
in 2011, an increaseon the 2010 figure of at least 527 executions worldwide. The increase
is largely due to a significantincrease in judicialkillings in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia."
4
5

Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 12 SCC 288 [Supreme Court of
India). [Hereinafter, "Swamy Shraddananda"}
Amnesty International, The State of World's Human Rights, POL/10/001/2011.
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Also, it can be clearly deduced that the gap between actual executions and
people sentenced to death is also increasing. In contrast to the execution figures
(676 known executions), at least 1,923 people were known to have been sentenced
to death in 63 countries in 2011. Amnesty International, in its 2011 report, pegs
the number of people sentenced to death at 313 in Pakistan and 108 in Malaysia.,
The following figures provided by Amnesty International shed some light on the
number of people sentenced to death in the year 2011.
Afghanistan (+), Algeria (51+), Bahrain (5), Bangladesh (49+), Belarus
(2), Botswana (1), Burkina Faso (3), Cameroon (+), Chad (+), China
(+), Congo (Republic of) (3), Democratic Republic of Congo (+), Egypt
(123+), Gambia (13), Ghana (4), Guinea (16), Guyana (3+), India (110+),
Indonesia (6+), Iran (156+), Iraq (291+), Japan (10), Jordan (15+), Kenya
(11+), Kuwait (17+), Lebanon (8), Liberia (1), Madagascar (+), Malawi
(2), Malaysia (108+), Mali (2), Mauritania (8), Mongolia (+), Morocco/
Western Sahara (5), Myanmar (33+), Nigeria (72), North Korea (+),
Pakistan (313+), Palestinian Authority (5+: 4 in Gaza; I in West Bank),
Papua New Guinea (5), Qatar (3+), Saint Lucia (1), Saudi Arabia (9+),
Sierra Leone (2), Singapore (5+), Somalia (37+:32+ by the Transitional
Federal Government; 4 in Puntland; 1 in Galmudug), South Korea (1),
South Sudan (1+), Sri Lanka (106), Sudan (13+), Swaziland (1), Syria
(+), Taiwan (16), Tanzania (+), Thailand (40), Trinidad and Tobago
(2), Uganda (5), United Arab Emirates (31+), USA (78), Viet Nam
(23+), Yemen (29+), Zambia (48), Zimbabwe (1+) (emphasis added).7
Death sentences, however, are said to be on a decline across the world.8

II. THE INDIAN POSITION
The Indian position on capital punishment has, of late, emerged as one of
the most interesting areas to study questions relating to criminal law within the
constitutional framework. While clearly, world-over, there is an unmistakable
march of law towards full fledged abolition or a defacto moratorium on capital
punishment, the Indian legislature continues to grope in the dark.
While it cannot be ignored that the judiciary has been at the forefront in
gradually reviewing the death sentencing provisions from many legislations that
6
7
8

Amnesty International Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, ACT 50/001/2012.
Supra note 6, at 7.
J.Balaji, Death Sentence on the Declinc across the World, THE HINDU, May 31, 2012.
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prescribed mandatory death sentencing, the legislature, it seems, is not able to let
go of the same as a punishment'
India, on a factual appraisal, has consistently maintained a stand against the
abolition of capital punishment at the international fora.' 0 It is interesting to note
that while voting against the Draft UN General Assembly Resolution imposing
a moratorium on the use of the death penalty in 2010, the Indian representative's
justification for the negative vote was that "India could not support the draft as it ran
counter to its statutory law."1

Globally, the picture is hopeful as more than two thirds of all countries have
abolished the death penalty either in law or in practice." India, the report of
Amnesty International notes, remained execution-free for the seventh consecutive
year as of March, 2012, though about 110 new death sentences were imposed just
in 2011, taking the total number of persons under sentence of death by 2011 to
somewhere between 400 and 500,13 including 3 women being on the death row.?
The President of India, Pratibha Patil, however, granted clemency to 35
persons who were condemned to death. They had murdered more than 60 persons,
out of which about 22 were women and children. In some quarters, it was believed,
that the President did so on account of her personal belief against the death sentence
which, however, was denied by the Presidential spokesperson.?

9
10

11

12
13
14

15

See The Petroleum And Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land)
Amendment Act, 2012; Bombay Prohibition (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2009.
India voted against the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions of 2007, 2008
and 2010 on "Moratorium on the Death Penalty". See A/RES/62/149, A/RES/63/168
and A/RES/65/206. India is also not a signatory to the "Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of
the death penalty" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 15 hof
December, 1989.
See 65 h United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly will Call for All States
to Establish a Moratorium on Executions with View to Abolishing Death Penalty, United

Nations (November 11, 2010), availableat http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/
gashc3996.doc.htm.
Supra note 6.
Supra note 6. There have, however, been no executions since 2004.

See Nikita Doval, Women on Death Row, THE WEEK, April 13, 2012.
See Syed Nazakat &Vijaya Pushkarna, PardoningPresident,THE WEEK, June 13, 2012.
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THE DEATH PENALTY LAWS IN INDIA

Modern judicial machinery condemning a man to death in India is always
traced back to Maharajah Nanda Kumar, his mock trial and the subsequent hanging
by the kangaroo court set up by Warren Hastings in June 1775." After the end of the
Company rule, the death penalty was used extensively during the British years too.
The British, who even hanged little children of 7 and 8 years of age for petty
thefts in Britain in the 1800s, ceased executing people by 194 and altogether
dropped the death penalty from their statute books by 1998. However, the Indian
Parliament did not do so. Despite dissenting voices from many members of the
Constituent Assembly during the debates, the death penalty managed to seep
through and remain in the system. As far as the legislature is concerned, bills kept
getting introduced both for its abolition and for its inclusion in more and more
laws. However, the bills proposing abolition kept getting defeated in one way or
the other." And now, in the most recent times, the legislature finds it appropriate
to include even tampering with an oil pipeline or selling illicit liquor among the
offenses punishable by death. 9
The Law Commission of India also opined that "India cannot risk the experiment
of abolition of capital punishment" 0 and some of the recent ventures of the Law

Commission of India, oddly, have involved exploring alternative methods of
21
putting condemned persons to death.
The judiciary has also been divided on the issue of the desirability of the
death penalty. Public utterances of judges on non-judicial matters make for
16

Anonymous, The First Impeachment: An Insight into the First Great Criminal trial before
the Supreme Court, INDIA ToDAY, August 20, 2011.

17

See ARmUR KoESTLER,

18
19
20
21

REFLECTIONS ON HANGING

(1997).

It is also to be noted that the United States, which is one of the biggest supporters of
death sentencing used to execute minors till the judgment of the United States Supreme
Court in Roper v. Simmonds, 543 US 551 (2005). A totalof 366 juvenile offenders were
executed by 2005. See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences
and Executionsfr Juvenile CrimesJanuary1,1973 - February28, 2005, The International
Justice Project (May 4, 2004), availableat http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/
pdfs/JuvDeathApriI2004.pdf.
For a discussion on the topic, see Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979
SC 916 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter, "Rajendra Prasad"]
Supra note 9.
3 5 h Report of the Law Commission of India, Capital Punishment (1967).
1871" Report of the Law Commission of India, Mode of Execution of Death Sentence

and Incidental Matters (2003).

To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum
interesting analysis. Justice A.K. Ganguly, who retired recently from the Supreme
Court of India, termed the death penalty as "barbaric","anti-lift", "undemocratic"
and "irresponsible",but "legal"."
On the other hand, Justice Arijit Pasayat, another former Judge of the Supreme
Court of India, opined that "punishmentfor the rape of a child should be nothing less
than a death sentence in any court of law."2
Apart from the issue of death penalty simpliciter, we are in 2012, still finding
ourselves dealing with the issue of mandatory death sentence. While the mandatory
death sentence prescribed under Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code was struck
down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional as far back as in 1983 in Mithu v.
State of Punjab," still the mandatory death sentence was till recently a valid penalty
under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989, Section 31-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 19852S
and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959. It is to be noted that Section 31-A of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was read down by the
Bombay High Court in Indian Harm Reduction Network v. Union of India.? The court
held such mandatory imposition of the death penalty to be violative of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India and directed the judges to use discretion while choosing
22

23

24
25

26

J. Venkatesan, Death Penalty is Barbaric,Says Judge, THE HNDvu, November 16, 2011.
See the views of K.G. Balakrishnan, Chairperson, National Human Rights Commission
in The Hindu, August 2,2010: ".. if you ask me, I personallyfoel that the death penalty
should continue. It has got a very great deterrent effect on society."
See however, K.G. Balakrishnan's interview by Maneesh Chibber, The Indian Express,
May 7, 2012: "Personally and speakingfor the commission,I can't support the death penalty.
It is cruel,"
Anonymous, Child Rapist Deserves DeathPenalty: Retd. Justice, Times of India, December
6,2009.
See however, Justice K.T. Thomas, Death Penalty is Nothing but BrutalMurder by State,
The Asian Age (September 2,2011), http://www.asianage.com/ideas/death-penaltynothing-brutal-murder-state-814.
Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter,
"Mithu"}
It is also worth mentioning here that the Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee in response
to a parliamentary question has indicated that he is considering bringing an amendment
to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, thereby dropping
the mandatory death penalty provision for repeat drug offenders. See Anonymous,
Mandatory Death PenaltyProvision may be DroppedfromNDPS Act, TIMES OF INDIA, May
9, 2012.
Indian Harm Reduction Network v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010
(June 16, 2011) [Bombay High Court], available at http://www.lawyerscollective.org/
files/IHRN%2judgment.pd f.
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punishment under the said section. Similarly, Section 27(3) of the Arms Act has
recently been struck down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjabv. Dalbir Singh2t
as being unconstitutional following Mithu. Earlier, the mandatory death sentence
was also prescribed under Section 3(2)(i) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1985, which later underwent amendment in 1987.
It is also worth noting that Mithu has led an international drive of eliminating
the mandatory death penalty from the statute books. It has been referred to by the
judicial bodies in other jurisdictions, including the Privy Council.2
However, in Saibanna v. State of Karnataka", the Supreme Court made an
attempt to bring back Section 303 though the side door. In Saibanna the Supreme
Court seems to have revived the spirit of Section 303, Indian Penal Code which
prescribed a mandatory death sentence for murder by life convicts, and was struck
off as being unconstitutional by it in Mithu way back in 1983. The Saibannacourt held:
A prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound to serve the
remainder of his life in prison unless the sentence is commuted
or remitted and that such sentence could not be equated with any
fixed term.... If that be so, there could be no imposition of a second
life term on the appellant before us as it would be a meaningless
exercise... In the teeth of Section 427(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 it is doubtful whether a person already undergoing
sentence of imprisonment for life can be visited with another term of
imprisonment for life to run consecutively with the previous one...
Thus, taking all the circumstances in consideration, we are of the
view that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that
the appellant's case bristles with special circumstances requisite for
imposition of the death penalty.
It is to be noted that the incompatibility of Saibanna with Mithu was noted
subsequently by the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar SatishbhushanBariyarv. State
of Maharashtra.3
27

29

State of Punjab v.Dalbir Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 346 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter,
"DalbirSingh"]
Various decisions of overseas jurisdictions referring to Mithu include Rv.Hughes, [20021
2 WLR 1058, Reyes v.The Queen, [2002] 2 WLR 1034, Boyce v. The Queen, [2005] 1 AC
400, Matthew v. States Trinidad and Tobago,[2005] 1AC 433, Watson v. The Queen,
[200511 AC 472 and Bowe v.Queen, [200611 WLR 1623. This has been noticed by the
Supreme Court of India in Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC
230 [Supreme Court of India] [Hereinafter, "Aloke Nath Dutta"] and Dalbir Singh.
Saibanna v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 165 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter,

30

Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498

28

"Saibanna"]

[Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter, "Bariya"I
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In another shocking development, the Piracy Bill, 2012 which was tabled in
the Parliament on April 24,2012, if accepted in its original form would be restoring
the mandatory death penalty in India.51
Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code assumes significance in this context.
Even in the jurisdictions where the death penalty remains in the statute books,
generally a sentence of death is not imposed unless the crime concerned has
resulted in someone's death or unless it is a crime against the State. The United
States Supreme Court had held in the decision of Kennady v. Louisiana- that the State
has no power to impose the death penalty against an individual for committing
a crime that did not result in the death of the victim except in the case of crimes
against the State.
However, Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code, which was inserted in
the said Act by the Criminal Laws Amendment Act of 1993, speaks in a different
language. The section says that:
Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in
detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to
cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a
reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or
hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the
Government or any foreign State or international inter-governmental
organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act
or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death or imprisonment
for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
It is to be noted that it confers a wide discretion on the court to even award
the death sentence though death is not caused to the victim, though the courts
have seldom used such a power.
The issue of death penalty took a dramatic turn towards abolitionism with
the rulings of the Supreme Court of India that death penalty for murder must be
restricted to the 'rarest of rare' cases. However, even this instruction, has mostly
been contradicted by the legislature by its consistent increasing of the number of
offences punishable by death.

31

§3, Piracy Bill, 2012.

32

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 US 407 (2008) [US Supreme Court].
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However, it is not uncommon to see certain retentionist demands from the
side of the judiciary as well. Recently, one of the Sessions Courts in New Delhi
requested the Parliament to provide for the death sentence to be included as a
punishment for certain other categories of offences too.?
In Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi),3 the Apex Court opined that honour
killings, for whatever reason, come within the category of the rarest of rare cases
deserving death punishment, thereby indirectly hinting at the possibility of laying
down a judicial "mandatory death sentencing policy" for such class of offenses. It
opined that "All persons who are planning to perpetrate"honour" killings should know
that the gallows await them." Subsequently in Mehboob Batcha v. State" the court even
went to the extent of saying that "murder by policemen in police custody is in our
opinion in the category of rarest of rare cases deserving death sentence."

IV. DEATH

PENALTY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS:
THE BACHAN SmnGH FRAMEWORK

The concerns regarding arbitrariness and discrimination in the processes
leading to a death sentence are indeed grave. Such factors would render India's
use of the death penalty to be in violation of International Law and standards. The
sentencing norm on the death penalty in India is that the death penalty is not a
rule but an exception. But this was not so from the beginning.

33

34
35

See State v. Sunil Kumar &Another, Sessions Case No. 56 of 2009 (April 12, 2012) IDelhi
Sessions Court], which held as follows: "This Court feels that ourwise representativesin
the Parliament should provide for capital punishment of death in such like cases also where
seniorcitizens are the victims, so as to teach a lesson to the offenders and to deter othersfrom
indulging in crime againstsenior citizens."
There have been more instances of such innovative demands from the side of the
judiciary regarding punishments. An Additional Sessions Judge in Delhi recently
called on the Parliament to explore "the possibility of permitting the imposition of
alternative sentences of surgical castration or chemical castration in cases involving
rape of minors and serial offenders." See State v.Dinesh Yadav, FIR No. 138/2009 (April
30, 2011) [Sessions Court, New Delhi] and State v.Nandan, FIR No. 72/2011 (January
24, 2012) [Sessions Court, New Delhi].
Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 6 SCC 396 [Supreme Court of India].
[Hereinafter, "Bhagwan Dass"]
Mehboob Batcha v.State, (2011) 7 SCC 45 [Supreme Court of India].
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The decision in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh6 involved a failed
challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty. Its importance lies in the
fact that it highlighted the need for noting "special reasons" when imposing death
sentences. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,37 which followed, was a landmark
decision, which despite affirming the constitutionality of the death penalty, diluted
the scope of its imposition substantially by introducing the test of 'rarest of rarest
cases'. It held that:
...
for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule
and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for
the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life
through law's instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the
rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably
foreclosed."

The Bachan Singh verdict sought to put to rest the ever widening divide in
the court on the subject of the death penalty, which reached a climax in some of
the divided decisions of the court towards the late 1970s,' It also put an end to
the interpretative disparity triggered by the amendment of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The court, in addition to the 'rarest of rarest' dictum, also emphasised
the need for individualised sentencing. It emphasised that when the court is inclined
to award the death penalty with all other alternative options being unquestionably
foreclosed, strict compliance shall be made of the pre-sentence hearing and "special
reasons"" must be given for awarding such a sentence.
Bachan Singh has been a watershed moment for the capital punishment law in
India. It laid down the law and emphasised the judicial role in relation to the death
penalty The description of the judicial role in Bachan Singh is a very nuanced and
sensitive formulation which is pregnant with strong caution and advice. To that
extent, it was supposed to define the judicial approach to be employed in capital
sentencing cases. The court held:

36
37
38
39

40

Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 947 [Supreme Court of India].
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter,
"Bachan Singh"]
Bachan Singh, 209.
See Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 916 [Supreme Court of
India]; Dalbir Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745 [Supreme Court of
India].
See Panchhi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1998) 7 SCC 177 [Supreme Court of India].
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There are numerous other circumstances justifying the passing of
the lighter sentence; as there are countervailing circumstances of
aggravation. We cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer
all such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an
imperfect and undulating society. Nonetheless, it cannot be overemphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in the area
of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by
the courts in accord with the sentencing policy writ large in Section
354(3). Judges should never be bloodthirsty, Hanging of murderers
has never been too good for them.
Facts and figures albeit incomplete, furnished by the Union of India,
show that in the past Courts have inflicted the extreme penalty
with extreme infrequency - a fact which attests to the caution and
compassion which they have always brought to bear on the exercise
of their sentencing discretion in so grave a matter. It is, therefore,
imperative to voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad
illustrative guidelines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous
function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern,
directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in Section
354(3), viz., that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is
the rule and death sentence an exception. Areal and abiding concern
for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life
through law's instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the
rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably
foreclosed (emphasis added).
But the aforementioned guidance on sentencing approach has either been
lost sight of or has been subject to conflicting interpretations. The different
interpretations employed by the courts in death penalty cases have given rise to
a subjective judicial environment which has been noted in Swamy Shraddhananda.
In Bariyar, the Supreme Court expressed in unequivocal terms the
constitutional implications including concerns relating to arbitrariness involved
in deciding the death penalty cases. This constitutional perspective was also
highlighted in Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra."
The Supreme Court in Bariyar observed:
135. A survey of the application of rarest of rare doctrine in various
courts will reveal that various courts have given their own meaning
41

Mold. Farooq Abdul Gafur and An. v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 SCC 641
[Supreme Court of India].
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to the doctrine. This variation in the interpretation of Rarest of rare
analysis may amount to be constitutionally infirm because of apparent
arbitrariness on the count of content of the doctrine.
136. The moot question is whether, after more than quarter of a century
since Bachan Singh recognized death penalty as a constitutionally
permissible penalty, we can distill a meaningful basis from our
precedent on death penalty, for distinguishing the few cases in
which the capital sentence is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not? A similar question was put by Justice Stewart in Furman.
He noted death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
as being "struck by lightning is cruel and unusual". Moreover, the
petitioners sentenced to death were seen as "capriciously selected
random handful" and the question posed was whether the eighth
amendment could tolerate death sentences "so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed." Today, it could be safely said in the context of
Indian experience on death penalty that no standards can be culled out
from thejudge made law which governs the selection of penalty apart
from broad overall guideline of rarest of rare under Bachan Singh.
137. Frequent findings as to arbitrariness in sentencing under Section
302 may violate the idea of equal protection clause implicit under
Article 14 and may also fall foul of the due process requirement under
Article 21. It is to be noted that we are not focusing on whether wide
discretion to choose between life imprisonment and death punishment
under Section 302 is constitutionally permissible or not. The subjectmatter of inquiry is how discretion under Section 302 may result
in arbitrariness in actual sentencing. Section 302 as held by Bachan
Singh is not an example of law which is arbitrary on its face but is an
instance where law may have been arbitrarily administered.
Equal protection clause ingrained under Article 14 applies to the
judicial process at the sentencing stage. We share the court's unease
and sense of disquiet in Swamy Shraddananda case and agree that a
capital sentencing system which results in differential treatment of
similarly situated capital convicts effectively classify similar convict
differently with respect to their right to life under Article 21. Therefore,
an equal protection analysis of this problem is appropriate.
In the ultimate analysis, it serves as an alarm bell because if capital
sentences cannot be rationally distinguished from a significant
number of cases where the result was a life sentence, it is more than
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an acknowledgement of an imperfect sentencing system. In a capital
sentencing system if this happens with some frequency there is a
lurking conclusion as regards the capital sentencing system becoming
constitutionally arbitrary.
139. We have to be, thus, mindful that the true import of rarest of rare
doctrine speaks of an extraordinary and exceptional case.
The Supreme Court in Bariyat 2 built on the arbitrariness thesis provided
in Swamy Shraddananda. In Swamy Shraddananda the Supreme Court noted the
following with "extraordinarycandour":
32. The same point is made in far greater detail in a report called,
"Lethal Lottery, The Death Penalty in India" compiled jointly by
Amnesty International India and Peoples Union For Civil Liberties,
Tamil Nadu & Puducherry. The report is based on the study of
Supreme Court judgments in death penalty cases from 1950 to 2006.
One of the main points made in the report (see chapter 2 to 4) is
about the Court's lack of uniformity and consistency in awarding
death sentence.
33. The truth of the matter is that the question of death penalty is
not free from the subjective element and the confirmation of death
sentence or its commutation by this Court depends a good deal on
the personal predilection of the judges constituting the bench.
34. The inability of the Criminal Justice System to deal with all major
crimes equally effectively and the want of uniformity in the sentencing
process by the Court lead to a marked imbalance in the end results.
On the one hand there appears a small band of cases in which the
murder convict is sent to the gallows on confirmation of his death
penalty by this Court and on the other hand there is a much wider
area of cases in which the offender committing murder of a similar or
a far more revolting kind is spared his life due to lack of consistency
by the Court in giving punishments or worse the offender is allowed
to slip away unpunished on account of the deficiencies in the Criminal
Justice System.
Thus, the overall larger picture gets asymmetric and lop-sided and
presents a poor reflection of the system of criminal administration of
justice. This situation is matter of concern for this Court and needs
to be remedied.
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See Autri Saha & Pritika Rai Advani, The Death Penalty: A New Perspective in Light of
Santosh BariyarCase, 2 NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF JURimciAL SCIENCES LAW REviEW 668
(2009).

To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum
A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, (R. Basant and Vinod Chandran,

J.J.) differed in their opinion in State of Kerala v. PradeepBorah on the question as
to whether the Sessions judges also have the power to impose a harsher variety of
the life sentence recognised by Swami Shraddanandaas an option available to avoid
the harshest, irreversible and incorrectable sentence of death.

V. MANY AVATARS OF THE 'RAREST OF RARE' TEST
The immediate impact of Bachan Singh can be seen in Earabhadrappav.State
of Karnataka," in which Justice A.P Sen, who was the chief dissenter in many of
the abolitionist judgments of Justice Krishna lyer, was, "constrainedto commute the
sentence of death passed on the appellant into onefor imprisonmentfor life"" due to the
test laid down in Bachan Singh being "unfortunately" not fulfilled in the said case.
In the times that followed, the effect of Bachan Singh slowly started wearing
off, with some decisions affirming death sentences without making even a passing
reference to it."
In fact, in a number of judgments after Bachan Singh where the Supreme
Court upheld the death sentence, there was no discussion of the 'rarest of rare'
formulation or of the Bachan Singh guidelines. After all the discourse on aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, etc. by the previous benches, in Lok Pal Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh,4 all that the Court said was, "This was a cruel and heinous
murder and once the offence is proved then there can be no other sentence except the death
sentence that can be imposed."
In Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar," a case involving kidnapping and rape of
a minor girl, while upholding the sentence of death imposed on the accused, the
Supreme Court opined as follows:
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So long the death sentence is provided in the statute and when
collective conscience of the community is petrified, it is expected that
the holders of judicial power do not stammer dehors their personal
opinion and inflict death penalty. These are the broad guidelines
which this Court has laid down for imposition of the death penalty...
This act no doubt had invited extreme indignation of the community
and shocked the collective conscience of the society. Their expectation
from the authority conferred with the power to adjudicate, is to inflict
the death sentence which is natural and logical.
Shortage of reasoning and simple affirmation of death sentences with no
reference to Bachan Singh were the hallmark of some of the decisions in the late
1980s."' Some in addition to all that even went to the extent of claiming to be
upholding the concerns of the common man while doing so.O
The Court, however, did admit in Aloke Nath Dutta the failure on its part to
evolve a uniform sentencing policy in capital punishment cases and to conclude
as to what amounted to 'rarest of rare'.
It also remains a fact that in many cases, the Apex Court itself has failed to
consider the question as to whether the burden of proving the lack of potential
for reform as laid down in Bachan Singh has been effectively discharged by the
State. The decisions that followed Bachan Singh generally kept reflecting the
growing abolitionist inclinations of the Apex Court, albeit with some exceptional
inconsistencies n
In 2011, the Apex Court in the case of Ajitsingh HarnamsinghGujral5 in which,

focusing solely on the nature of the crime committed by the convict (which was in
fact gruesome and heinous), the court gave a go by to the "State's responsibilityto
prove impossibility of rehabilitation"guideline in Bachan Singh, reiterated in Bariyar.
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To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum
Critics clamored that it amounted to the replacement of need for evidence with the
Judge's personal opinions. The court however, added, in the said judgment that
It is only the legislature which can abolish the death penalty and not
the courts. As long as the death penalty exists in the statute book
it has to be imposed in some cases, otherwise it will tantamount to
repeal of the death penalty by the judiciary It is not for the judiciary
to repeal or amend the law, as that is in the domain of the legislature.
In a contrasting decision, the court however, rekindled the hopes of the
abolitionists. In Sham v. State of Maharashtra"'
the court set aside the death penalty
imposed by the High Court on the accused noting that he could be reformed or
rehabilitated. However therein it agreed with the decision in Afitsingh, a decision
relied upon by the prosecution, distinguishing, however, the facts thereof from
that of the case before it.
In Ramnareshv. State of Chattisgarh," the Apex Court reiterated the importance
of giving special reasons holding that
The law contemplates recording of special reasons and, therefore,
the expression 'special' has to be given a definite meaning and
connotation. 'Special reasons' in contra-distinction to 'reasons'
simpliciter conveys the legislative mandate of putting a restriction on
exercise of judicial discretion by placing the requirement of special
reasons.
In Amrit Singh v. State of PunjabM the accused had raped a minor child which
ultimately led to her death. The court noted that though the manner in which
the deceased was raped might have been brutal but it could well have been a
momentary lapse on part of the accused, seeing a lonely girl at a secluded place.
"The offence may look heinous," the court further said, "but under no circumstances it
can be said to be [a] rarestof rare case."
The 'rarest of rare' test came into controversy5 ' due to the pronouncement
in the Bhagwan Dass verdict due to the suggested inclusion of 'honour killings' in
the 'rarest of rare' category. 'Honour killing' does not have any precise definition.
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This was as much a misreading of Bachan Singh as the decision in Ravindra
Trimbak ChouthmaP8 case wherein the court held that dowry death couldn't be
placed in the category which could be regarded as the 'rarest of the rare' type due
to the increasing number of dowry deaths.
The inconsistency in the sentencing policy of different benches is also visible
in some of the recent judgments.
For instance, in Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh," decided on 231d February,
2012, the death sentence of the accused who had kidnapped, raped and killed a
minor girl aged 3 years was converted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court
considering the chances of reformation and other factors, A week thereafter, on 290
February, 2012, a different bench of the same court, in Rajendra PrahladraoWasnik
v. State of Maharashtra,6- a similar case involving the rape and murder of a 3 year
old girl, affirmed the death penalty imposed on the accused only on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
Only lip service was paid therein to the guidelines enunciated in Bachan
Singh,with no discussion at all as to the possibility of reformation or rehabilitation
of the accused, stating that the accused by his conduct had belied the human
relationship and confidence.
In the same month, on 23 1d February, 2012, in a case" involving dacoity and
murder, the court confirmed, without recording elaborate reasons, the death
sentence on the accused holding inter alia that the trial court had not found "any
mitigating circumstances in favour of the appellant to avoid death penalty". The Court,
without discussion, concluded that "the accused is a menace to the society, is beyond
reform and therefore deserves a death sentence." It has to be further noted that another
bench of the Court, just a day prior to the pronouncement in Rajendra, i.e. on 28th
February, 2012, in a caset where the appellant was sentenced to death on the basis
of circumstantial evidence, commuted the same to life imprisonment.
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To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum
It may be true that facts of each case may appear to be different but the
principle on which the same are determined must be objective.
Consistency in sentencing leading to death of a person is an important factor
in the delivery of justice. It acquires phenomenal significance when the outcome
results in depriving the life of an individual.
Sir Anthony Mason, the 9 h Chief Justice of Australia, observed as follows:
Just as consistency in punishment - a reflection of the notion of equal
justice - is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of
criminal justice, so inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded
as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is
calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity
of the administration of justice."
Also significant is the observation of Chief Justice Gleeson of Australia in Wong
v. The Queen:
All discretionary decision-making carries with it the probability of
some degree of inconsistency. But there are limits beyond which
such inconsistency itself constitutes a form of injustice. The outcome
of discretionary decision-making can never be uniform, but it
ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge
who happens to hear the case. Like cases should be treated in like
manner. The administration of criminal justice works as a system; not
merely as a multiplicity of unconnected single instances. It should
be systematically fair, and that involves, amongst other things,
reasonable consistency."

VI.

ROT IN THE ROOT: TRIAL PROCESSES AND THE NEED
FOR REVISITING THE DEATH PENALTY

One of the fundamental issues with regard to judicial condemnation of a
man to death is regarding the degree or errors and omissions that the trial process
is susceptible to.
Mr. Raymond Bonner succinctly commented on the stark reality behind the
criminal justice system in America." It is one thing to impose the punishment of
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imprisonment wrongly, but it entirely different to wrongly direct the life of a person
to be taken. This is especially to be noted in the context of the appellate courts,
which have to make their decision entirely on the basis of the evidence before them
and have no scope for probing into the truth outside such evidence. It is in this
context that the question of the reliability of the trial process, which has the power
to conclude that a person deserves to die, assumes significance. The situation in
the United States needs no elaboration. It is a routine matter in that country that
people are sentenced and executed after trials riddled with deficiencies and even
the United States Supreme Court turns a blind eye towards such cases."
Corinna Barrett Lain, a Professor of Law at the University of Richmond, in her
article "Deciding Death",0 speaks about the general character of people condemned
to death in the United States as follows:
Capital defendants are about as unpopular a minority as one can
find (for obvious and perfectly legitimate reasons)-and those who
end up on death row tend to be poor" black'" and the recipients of
woefully inadequate legal representation." The politics of death
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In violation of its international obligations, the State of Texas tried and executed Mr.
Humberto Leal Garcia, a Mexican citizen, without informing him that as a Mexican
national, he was entitled to assistance from the Mexican consul under the Vienna
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International Court of Justice in Mexico v. United States of America (Avena and Other
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of execution petitions, in which the defendant was well represinted at trial.").
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only exacerbate their vulnerability, leaving little reason to trust other
institutional actors to exercise self-restraint.
The question is, whether we are in a position to say something positive about
the Indian judicial system on this count. The answer, unfortunately, would be a
big, emphatic "no".
When it is an accepted position even in India that trial processes are not
immune from errors, mistakes and deficiencies, can we confidently hand the
hangman's noose to the trial courts, trusting that they would exercise their
discretion to direct the life of the convicts tobe taken properly? Does our legal and
precedential framework surrounding the imposition of the death penalty possess
enough consistency and certainty to prevent injustice in the cases of this nature?
Again, the answer will have to be rendered in the negative.
Instances exposing the perilous susceptibility of trial processes to go wrong
in this country are aplenty and have been noticed by the Supreme Court in various
cases before it."
The practice of some of the trial courts in imposing the extreme sentence of
death, not only ignoring" the sentencing principles laid down by the Apex Court
in this regard but also foregoing the very basic principles of a fair and just trial is
to be noticed in this context.
In Mohd.Hussain v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)," the Trial Court had
appointed a counsel at the State's expense to defend the accused, an illiterate
Pakistani national and he remained absent most of the time, especially during the
examination of a large number of witnesses, many of whose testimonies were relied
71
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upon for imposing the death sentence upon the accused. Although expressing
different opinions as to the final decision, the learned judges of the Supreme Court
agreed that the conviction and sentence of the accused was vitiated.
It is probably to that end that the imposition of the death penalty in India
should be revisited.
Even the former President of India, Mr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam was of the opinion
that the concept of the death penalty deserves a debate in the Parliament as regards
its continued maintenance in the statute books!'
The fate of various convicts sentenced to death shall be soon decided as
the Supreme Court has reserved judgments in various cases including thoseof
Devender Pal Singh Bhullar and Mahindra Nath Das.

VII. "MISTAKES"
In another startling disclosure of the ills of the death penalty system, the
Supreme Court in Bariyar noted many decisions of the Supreme Court to be per
incuriam Bachan Singh. The court observed:
Curiously in Ravji alias Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
1996 SC 787 [Hereinafter, "Ravji"] this Court held that it is only
characteristics relating to crime, to the exclusion of the ones relating
to criminal, which are relevant to sentencing in criminal trial, stating:
.-The crimes had been committed with utmost cruelty and brutality
without any provocation, in a calculated manner. It is the nature
and gravity of the crime but not the criminal, which are germane
for consideration of appropriate punishment in a criminal trial. The
Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not
awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the
individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal
and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must
not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the
atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the
enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should
respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal.
We are not oblivious that this case has been followed in at least 6
decisions of this Court in which death punishment has been awarded
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in last 9 years, but, in our opinion, it was rendered per incuriam.
Bachan Singh (supra) specifically noted the following on this point:
...The present legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read
with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or
making the choice of sentence for various offences, including one
under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court should not confine its
consideration "principally" or merely to the circumstances connected
with the particular crime, but also give due consideration to the
circumstances of the criminal.
Shivaji @Dadya Shankar Alhat v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009
SC 56, Mohan Anna Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC
113; Bantu v. The State of U.P., (2008) 1I SCC 113, Surja Ram v. State
of Rajasthan, 1997 Cri Q 51 DayanidhiBisoi v. State of Orissa, 2003
Cri LJ 3697; State of U.P. v. Sattan @Satyendra and Ors., (2009) 4 SCC
736 are the decisions where Ravji Rao (supra) has been followed.
It does not appear that this Court has considered any mitigating
circumstance or a circumstance relating to criminal at the sentencing
phase in most of these cases. It is apparent that Ravji Rao (supra) has
not only been considered but also relied upon as authority on the
point that in heinous crimes, circumstances relating to criminal are
not pertinent (emphasis added).
The court's decision in Bariyar holding Ravji to be per incuriam was ratified
by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in Dilip PremnarayanTiwariv. State
of Maharashtra" and Rajesh Kumar v. State through Govt. of NCT of Delhi." The
realisation that the decision in Ravji was rendered per incuriam came too late for at
least 2 prisoners sentenced to death on the basis of this flawed reasoning, including
Ravji himself. Ravji was executed on May 4, 1996 and Surja Ram was executed
on April 7, 1997. The remaining 12 persons sentenced to death on the basis of the
Ravji decision continue to languish on death row.
Ironically, in Sunder Singh v. State of Uttaranchat" the Supreme Court once
again made references to the Ravji decision to finally affirm the death sentence on
the accused whohad murdered 5 people in an incident that had happened in 1989"
Dilip Premnarayan Tiwari v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 1 SCC 775 [Supreme Court
of India].
77 Rajesh Kumar v. State through Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2011 (13) SCC 706 [Supreme
Court of India].
78 Sunder Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, (2010) 10 SCC 611 [Supreme Court of Indiaj.
79 See the reference to Ravfi also in Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012)
2 SCC 648 ISupreme Court of India].
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VIII. CAPITAL CONVICTS ON DEATH Row
Also, while awaiting the outcome of the mercy petition, the prisoner on
death row is subjected to a "lingering death", which is something more than the
mere extinguishment of life. He exists under the specter of death, coping with a
crippling uncertainty about whether he will live to see another day or not. This
degrading and brutalising effect on the human spirit of the condemned prisoner
is the most disturbing and horrific aspect of the death row phenomenon. This
has been considered to constitute psychological torture and cruel punishment
in various jurisdictions including India." Justice Krishna Iyer also alluded to
this dehumanizing aspect of the death row phenomenon when he pointed out
in Rajendra Prasadthat because the condemned prisoner had "the hanging agony
hanging over his head since 1973 (i.e. for six years)... he must by now be more a vegetable
than a person.""
Indian courts have also contributed to another significant aspect of the law
on death row. Whether the fact that the condemned prisoner has committed the
most horrific crimes shall be a factor in extending the constitutional protection of
dignified treatment to the convict has been aptly answered by the Indian courts
in the negative. In Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. AttorneyGeneral,82 the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe took inspiration from Sher Singh and
Others v. State of Punjab and observed:
Having regard to the impressive judicial and academic consensus
concerning the death row phenomenon, the prolonged delays and
the harsh conditions of incarceration, Iam convinced that a sufficient
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degree of seriousness has been attained as to entitle the applicant to
invoke on behalf of the condemned prisoners the protection against
inhuman treatment afforded them by s 15(1) of the Constitution.
.... It is whether the acute mental suffering and brooding horror of
being hanged which has haunted them in their condemned cells
over the long lapse of time since the passing of sentence of death
is consistent with the guarantee against inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment. For, like art 21 of the Constitution of
India, s 15(1) stands as sentinel over human misery, degradation
and oppression. Its voice is that of justice and fairness. It can never
be silenced on the ground that the time to heed to its dictates ended
with the passing of the death penalty. It echoes through all stages the trial, the sentence, the incarceration on death row and, finally, the
execution. See Sher Singh and Others v State of Punjab.
It is also interesting to note that that while the Privy Council in Riley v. AttorneyGeneral ofJamaica8Y held by a majority decision that a delay in carrying out execution
could afford no ground for commuting the said death sentence, Lord Scarman and
Lord Brightman concluded their dissenting judgment by observing:
It is, of course, true that a period of anguish and suffering is an
inevitable consequence of sentence of death. But a prolongation of it
beyond the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve
is not. And it is no answer to say that the man will struggle to stay
alive. In truth, it is this ineradicable human desire which makes
prolongation inhuman and degrading... Prolonged delay when it
arises from factors outside the control of the condemned man can
render a decision to carry out the sentence of death an inhuman and
degrading punishment...
It is also interesting to note that Supreme Court of India, has all along relied
upon the minority opinion of Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman in Riley v. AttorneyGeneral of Jamaica(See Sher Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and T.V. Vatheeswaran
v. State of Tamil Nadu.")
The Privy Council turned around and reached a similar position in Earl Pratt
and Ivan Morgan v. The Attorney Generalfor Jamaica,85 when it reversed the majority
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opinion in Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica.Relying on the decisions of the Indian
Supreme Court, in Earl Prattthe Privy Council observed:
In Smt. Treveniben v. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 S.C.J. 383 the Supreme
Court of India approved the judgment in Sher Singh v. The State
of Punjab and held that a sentence of death imposed by the "Apex
Court", which will itself have taken into account delay when imposing
the death sentence, can only be set aside thereafter upon petition to
the Supreme Court upon grounds of delay occurring after that date.
Oza J.said, at page 410:"If, therefore, there is inordinate delay in execution, the condemned
prisoner is entitled to come to the court requesting to examine whether,
it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed."
In their Lordships' view a State that wishes to retain capital punishment
must accept the responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as
swiftly as practicable after sentence, allowing a reasonable time for
appeal and consideration of reprieve.. .The death row phenomenon
must not become established as a part of our jurisprudence.'

IX. CONCLUSION
In this overall climate of somber reflection on issues relating to the
administration of capital punishment, some very important developments in the
capital sentencing law have swung the balance in favour of the capital convicts
substantially.
First, in Swamy Shraddananda, the court has emphasised the availability
of sentences other than the life sentence (a 14 year term) and death penalty to
the sentencing court. The court by invoking "the vast hiatus between 14 years'
imprisonmentand death" has significantly expanded the range of "alternativeoptions"
which need to be exhausted before opting for death. Thus, through this ruling the
Supreme Court has raised the threshold in favour of the convict in terms of the
Bachan Singh dicta - "that ought not to be done save in the rarest of rarecases when the
alternativeoption is unquestionablyforeclosed (emphasis added)."
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[Privy Council]. [Hereinafter, "Earl Pratt"]
Also see Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H. R.Rep. 439 (1989)
[European Court of Human Rights) wherein the European Court of Human Rights
held that possible exposure of a condemned prisoner for many years to the conditions
on death row and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present
shadow of death would violate protections against "inhuman or degradingtreatment or
punishrment."

To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum
The court held that:
If the Court's option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence
of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than 14
years and the other death, the court may feel tempted and find itself
nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would indeed
be disastrous. A far more just, reasonable and proper course would
be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact,
lawfully belongs to the court, i.e., the vast hiatus between 14 years'
imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasized that the Court
would take recourse to the expanded option primarily because in
the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years imprisonment would
amount to no punishment at all.
67. Further, the formalisation of a special category of sentence, though
for an extremely few number of cases, shall have the great advantage
of having the death penalty on the statute book but to actually use it as
little as possible, really in the rarest of the rare cases. This would only
be a reassertion of the Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh
(supra) besides being in accord with the modem trends in penology.
A study of death sentences in the post-Shraddhanandaphase reveals that many
cases which normally would have resulted in the award of death sentences to the
condemned prisoners, have got the benefit of various "alternativeoptions" between
s
the minimum sentence of 14 years to a sentence of full life. '
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Moreover, Indian jurisprudence on the death penalty is not oblivious to the
developments in international law as also worldwide trends on this issue." The
Supreme Court in Bariyarreferred to the international trends in the following terms:
117. Although these questions are not under consideration and
cannot be addressed here and now, we cannot help but observe the
global move away from the death penalty. Latest statistics show that
138 nations have now abolished the death penalty in either law or
practice (no executions for 10 years). Our own neighbours, Nepal and
Bhutan are part of these abolitionist nations while others including
Philippines and South Korea have also recently joined the abolitionist
group, in law and in practice respectively. We are also aware that on
18 December 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
resolution 62/149 calling upon countries that retain the death penalty
to establish a worldwide moratorium on executions with a view to
abolishing the death penalty.
118. India is, however, one of the 59 nations that retain the death
penalty.
It can safely be said that globally even in jurisdictions where death penalties
remain on the statute books there is a definitive movement away from indiscriminate
awarding of death sentences and actual executions resulting from death sentences
initially awarded. In that context, the solemn judicial approach to death penalty
cases was defined by the Supreme Court in Bariyar in the following words:
157. The fact that capital sentence is a live penalty in India; we should
strive to tune the practice to the evolving standards of a maturing
society. The normative thresholds attached thereto and evolving

88

The international trends on the death penalty continue to inform the penal philosophy
of the court in death penalty matters. Recently, in Rajesh Kumar v. State through Govt.
of NCT of Delhi, (2011) 13 SCC 706 (Supreme Court of India], the Supreme Court
quoted from the famous United States Supreme Court case of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958) fUS Supreme Court] and observed:
65. These two provisions do not stand in isolation but must be construed as
supplementing each other as ensuring the constitutional guarantee of a just, fair
and reasonable procedure in the exercise of sentencing discretion by the court.
66. These changes in the sentencing structure reflect the "evolving standards of
decency' that mark the progress of a maturing democracy and which is in
accord with the concept of dignity of the individual - one of the core values in
our Preamble to the Constitution, in a way these changes signify a paradigm shift
in our jurisprudence with the gradual transition of our legal regime from 'rule of
law' to the 'due process of law', to which this Court would advert to in the latter
part of the judgment."

To Kill Or Not To Kill: The Unending Conundrum

constitutional sensibilities shall continue to throw fresh challenges.
We have not fully resolved the dilemma arising from the fact that
the Constitution prohibits excessive punishment borne out of undue
process, but also permits, and contemplates that there will be capital
punishment arising out of an exercise of extremely wide discretion.
This dilemma is inherently difficult to resolve. And we should
refrain from enforcing any artificial peace on this landscape.
158. While choosing for one option or the other, these constitutional
principles must be borne in mind. The nature of capital sentencing is
such that it is important that we ask the right questions." (emphasis
added)
It goes without saying that the less wealth and influence a person has,
the more likely they are to be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged the class bias in death sentences. In his dissenting judgment
in Bachan Singh, Justice Bhagwati commented, "death penalty has a certain class
complexion or class bias in as much as it is largely the poor and the down-trodden who are
the victims of this extreme penalty. We would hardlyfind a rich or affluent person going
to the gallows." The judge concluded, "There can be no doubt that the death penalty in
its actual operation is discriminatory,for it strikes mostly against the poor and deprived
this circumstance also adds to the arbitraryand capricious
section of the community ...
natureof the death penalty and renders it unconstitutional."
The absence of detailed studies that track discrimination within the criminal
justice system more generally and the implementation of the death penalty more
specifically, should not be an excuse for ignoring this terrible injustice.
Recently, the Apex Court in Vodafone International Holdings BY v. Union
of India" stated that certainty is integral to the rule of law. In a case involving
the imposition of the death penalty, the courts cannot continue to judge under
uncertainty. The normative standards in this behalf must be finally settled leaving
the uncertainty into oblivion, which is the least the judiciary can do.
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